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What do we know through improvisation? 
Alessandro Bertinetto 
 
 
In this paper, which is exploratory in character, I address the question of 
whether, how, and what we know through artistic improvisation. Has artistic 
improvisation a specific cognitive supply? Can this alleged cognitive supply 
contribute to the aesthetic merit of the performance? And how? In order to 
answer these questions I will first explain which is exactly the problem we face. 
Secondly, I will try to give some suggestions to solve this problem. 
 
1. 
In everyday life agents improvise when they do something on the spot, without 
a previous plan. They improvise when they have to (re)act under pressure to 
unexpected circumstances without being properly prepared for the action. Thus, 
in everyday practices, agents improvise when they use  “the limited experience 
and resources at [their] disposal to carry out an activity in a (usually) time-
bounded situation” (Anderson 1995, 93). The way agents cope with unforeseen 
difficulties, adapting their intelligence to the unexpected affordances of the 
environment, can be more or less efficient and ingenious. It can be aesthetically 
satisfactory, in that, for example, one can find an elegant solution to an 
unexpected problem without previous preparation and without having the 
means ordinarily required to do it. 
Moreover, while improvising a solution to an unexpected problem, we can 
achieve a practical experiential knowledge about how to act in some 
unforeseen circumstances. However, the knowledge that we can achieve 
through improvisation in everyday life in virtue of solving some unexpected 
problems is not the kind of knowledge I am interested in here. My aim is rather 
to understand whether improvisation in the arts, i.e. artistic improvisation, can 
be the source of some specific knowledge and whether the knowledge gained 
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through improvisation can improve the aesthetic merit of the improvised 
performance. 
 
2. 
Three remarks concerning artistic improvisation and its epistemic significance 
are in order here.  
 
2.1. The first remark is the basic one. It concerns the general possibility of 
acquiring knowledge trough art. I take for granted that we can get knowledge 
through art and that this knowledge is or, at least, can be part of the value of 
art. The acceptance of this claim does not commit me to the radical thesis that 
“only items with cognitive value count as artworks” (Young 2001, 1), but only to 
the more modest thesis, that the knowledge acquired through art can be, and 
often is, an important source of aesthetic value. Of course the knowledge 
offered by art is not the kind of knowledge achievable through science. 
However, artworks can offer an understanding of some aspects of reality. 
Artworks can provide knowledge on matters on which science cannot always 
successfully cast light. Artworks can provide us with insights through which we 
can understand ourselves, our thoughts and emotions, and our relations with 
other people as well as our place in nature and in the social world (cf. Young 
2001, 21; Bertram 2005). Unlike science, art does not demonstrate theories 
about the world and about us by means of arguments; artworks rather show or 
illustrate perspectives on us and on our world. Through the perspectives offered 
by art –that can be judged as right or wrong– we enhance our understanding of 
ourselves and of our world. Art can provide non-propositional knowledge at 
least by means of illustrative representation (which can make use of 
expression) and exemplification. 
 
a) Something is a representation when is about something, is intended to be 
about something and is recognized as being about that something. According to 
James Young, semantic representations, which are used in science, represent 
because they are true. On the contrary, “illustrations represent because an 
experience of the illustration has something in common with experience of the 
object represented” (Young 2001, 26), which, besides a particular object or 
Disturbis 14 	  
	   3	  
event, can be also an affective states and classes or types of objects or events. 
The similarity between both experiences is recognized also in virtue of 
conventions. Through cultural conventions we can understand which are the 
relevant similarities between both experiences. Moreover, not only what, but 
also how it represents contributes to determine the forcefulness of the 
illustration. The success of the illustration in offering perspectives on ourselves 
and on the world can also require the capacity of activating our imagination 
and/or may work if it succeeds in making us feel emotions.  
b) Artworks can provide us with knowledge by means of literally or 
metaphorically exemplifying a property. They succeed in this when they refer to 
a property by literally or metaphorically possessing it. In order to grasp what is 
exemplified by an artwork we need to consider the right context. According to 
Keith Lehrer, exemplar representation, or exemplarization, works in the 
following way: the exemplar represents “content, a plurality of objects, which 
includes itself, as it is used as an exhibit to show us what the objects are like. 
The exemplar becomes a term of representation of the objects and may be 
affirmed of them in the way that a predicate is affirmed of a subject. So it is true 
that the exemplar applies to those objects it represents. Exemplarization marks 
a distinction defining content in such a way that the exemplar of representation 
is true of itself, that is, it is true that the exemplar applies to itself as it applies to 
other objects it represents.” (Lehrer 2012, 5) Briefly, “exemplarization yields a 
representation of content in terms of an experienced particular that stands for 
other particulars. Exemplarization involves the generalization of a particular.” 
(Lehrer 2012, 10) 
 
2.2. The second remark directly ensues from the first one. If art can offer 
knowledge through illustration and exemplification, then artistic improvisation, 
qua art, can provide knowledge too. In other words, if music, dance and theatre 
can be sources of some kind of knowledge –that adds to the artistic value of the 
respective works and performances–, then improvised music, dance, and 
theatre can, qua music, dance, and theatre, provide some of the kinds of 
knowledge we obtain through these performing arts.  
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2.3. The final remark concerns the kind of knowledge we should consider for 
assessing the cognitive weight of artistic improvisation and its aesthetic merit. 
In the last years some research has been devoted to studying the link between 
improvisation and learning processes. Researchers have focussed on two 
related areas. 
 
a) The first area concerns the learning process in artistic improvisation. In 
particular, it has been discovered that the way the competence of improvising is 
achieved is analogous to the way we acquire linguistic competences. The 
learning of the techniques of improvisation is a “learning trough doing”, that is, a 
“procedural knowledge” (Berkovitz 2010, 43, 72, 83, 117). This is especially 
clear in musical improvisation (Cf. Alterhaug 2010, 130; Sawyer 2010).1 
 
b) The second area of studies focuses on the link between improvisation as a 
way of acting and procedural learning of different kinds of practices. 
Researches in this field concern, in other words, the link between improvisation 
and education. Improvisation is here regarded as an important, although often 
neglected, way of achieving and organizing knowledge. According to many 
researchers, the importance of improvisation for education relies in its relational 
and experiential nature. Reality is apprehended not by means of reading of 
texts, but in a participatory way, i.e. by means of making, and subsequently 
interiorizing, trials and errors experiences (Gamelli 2006, 31). Also in art 
practices, exactly like in other practices, improvisation can be used as a useful 
tool for learning certain kinds of activities. We can learn to dance, to play 
theatre, to make music and also to paint or to make sculptures by means of 
improvising; moreover, by means of improvising music, dance, theatre, etc., 
one can also learn how to enact some movements, how to interact with other 
people, how to adapt old plans to new situations, etc. Through a more or less 
guided artistic improvisation we can get knowledge: it is the procedural 
knowledge about how to produce some kinds of artworks and performances as 
well as about the achievement of skills concerning body movements, social 
interactions, and the speaking of languages. Moreover, while performing, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The theoretical paradox of “learning to improvise” is discussed in Raymond 1980, 50-61. 
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improvisers can also obtain experiential information about their own 
personalities. For example, they can experience to which extent they are ready 
to risk for achieving set goals, whether and how they are willing to obey to rule, 
to which extent they are able and willing to collaborate in a team environment 
and exercise independent judgment and initiative, etc.  
However, here I am not interested in both these kinds of connections between 
improvisation and knowledge. 
On the one hand, the problem I am concerned with is not how one can learn or 
know how to improvise, by means of the interiorisation and routinization of 
skills. I am rather interested in what one can know through artistic improvisation. 
On the other hand, I am also not concerned –at least in the first place– with 
artistic improvisation as an instrumental technique for learning skills and for 
exploring the self of the performer who improvises. Improvisation is sometimes 
described as a maieutic process of discovery of the self, i.e. as a kind of 
“automaieutics” (Rousselot 2012, 56; De Raymond 1980, 165-169), in virtue of 
which improvisers, while acting in different media, find what they previously 
ignored about their personalities as well as about their ways to relate to other 
people and to the world. However, this instrumental improvisation, through 
which improvising performers can learn artistic practices (as well as other 
practices) and, by means of practising these activities, can get acquainted with 
themselves, is not the kind of improvisation I am interested in here. 
 
3. 
The point I want to make regards neither the cognitive processes of learning 
activities of different kinds (included artistic ones like music, dance or theatre, 
but also painting, sculpture, etc.) nor improvisation as a practice of self-
knowledge in virtue of which performers (or more generally: everyone who 
performs some artistic activity) discover themselves, while understanding 
aspects of themselves they otherwise could not get acquainted with.  
Those are important matters, of course. However, here I want to focus, rather, 
on the possible knowledge the audience can obtain through artistic 
improvisation and on the possible contribution of this knowledge to the artistic 
quality of the improvised performance. The reason of my interest here is simple.  
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The literature often focuses on the relationship between the improvising 
performer and his/her performance: it focuses on production. Due to the 
particular features of improvisational art practices,2 this approach is surely 
unavoidable. However, this is not enough here. In investigating the epistemic 
merit of an improvised artistic performance we are concerned with the way the 
improvised performance, precisely in virtue of its being improvised, improves 
the knowledge and understanding of the audience that attends the 
performance, offering perspectives through which they can enhance their 
experience of themselves, their historical and social world, and the reality in 
general. As in the case of other kinds of artworks, also in the case of improvised 
artistic practices we have to focus on reception, not on production. Hence, for 
the sake of precision, the question I am concerned with here can be expressed 
as follows. 
Assumed, as I did, that art can offer us knowledge, is there in the performing 
arts any specific contribution of artistic improvisation (i.e. improvisation as art, 
not as tool of learning artistic skills) to the way the possible knowledge offered 
by a performance increases its aesthetic qualities? Or is the improvisational 
quality of the performance irrelevant, at least under this respect? It is not that 
easy to answer this question, especially because there are very different styles 
and kinds of artistic improvisation. For instance, the way the characters of the 
Italian Commedia dell’Arte (or commedia all’improvviso) improvise is very 
different from the improvisation performed in contemporary Improv-theatre; and, 
in the musical field, improvisation in free jazz is different from improvisation in 
baroque music and also from free improvisation in the avant-garde. Therefore, 
artistic improvisational practices differ a big deal from each other in terms of 
kind of artistic practice and aesthetic style. 
Hence, the problem which I would like to solve may be reformulated in this way: 
in spite of the differences between styles and kinds of artistic improvisation, is it 
still possible to identify a specific epistemic influence of improvisation, as a 
particular kind of artistic production, on the aesthetic merit of an artistic 
performance? If yes, what does this specific contribution amount to?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Bertinetto 2012a and 2012b. 
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Although the answer I will offer in the following part of the paper will merely be 
tentative and explorative, I am convinced that the first step must consist in 
finding a general plausible frame of understanding for artistic improvisation, i.e. 
a plausible way to understand what is improvisation as an artistic practice. We 
need to find a definition that is so general as to encompass all kinds and styles 
of artistic improvisation and at the same time so specific as to provide us with a 
valid criterion for distinguishing improvisation from other artistic practices.  
 
4. 
In order to define artistic improvisation we should previously return back to 
improvisation as such. As such improvisation can be defined as an activity 
consisting in constructively coping with disorder (Dell 2004, 119), that is, with 
unforeseen and unexpected events occurring in a situation. The action 
performed is not planned: it is the adaptive re-action to a (more or less) 
unexpected emergence. Given unexpected circumstances we must sometimes 
act without previously planning the action: in these cases we are forced to act 
without knowing what to do. It is an acting “with the left hand”, as Walter 
Benjamin calls it in Einbahnstrasse (Benjamin 1980, 89); it is something one 
does without preparation, that is, without knowing hot to apply a rule of action 
(Brandstetter 2009, 133). 
However, there is also another important kind –or, perhaps better, another 
important aspect – of improvisation. We use to practise many everyday 
activities (walking, reading, writing, swimming, driving a car or a bicycle, etc.) 
without paying explicit conscious attention to them, because we have learned 
and assimilated, through imitation and exercise, the proper techniques. As 
again Benjamin says (Benjamin 1987, 97), we cannot unlearn those techniques 
that have become habitualised practices we usually perform in an automatic 
way. In this sense, while swimming, walking, driving a car, etc., we improvise, 
because we do not consciously plan what and how to do. Instead, we simply 
act, without conscious reflection upon the action. 
Both kinds, or both aspects, of improvisation are important for artistic 
improvisational performances. Artistic improvisation is a self-imposed and 
intentional kind of improvisation in which the invention and the performance 
thereof to some extent coincide. Artists interact with each other as well as with 
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the artistic frame, the social set and the natural environment, without previously 
knowing in advance what exactly will happen and what to do in response to 
what will happen. However, they have often achieved through practice an 
automatic control of techniques, so that they can play without consciously 
deciding each single step of their performance. The spontaneity of 
improvisation often consists precisely in this automatism. Therefore, artists are 
somehow prepared to improvise, because, normally, they have the required 
technical skills and experience. They follow the more or less fixed rules and 
conventions of a genre or a style, because they have embodied them, at least 
to a certain extent. Generally speaking, they should obey to the (aesthetics, 
cultural and technical) constraints paced upon a practice. Hence, what is 
achieved is never a creation ex nihilo.3 
Fore sure, there are different kinds and styles of artistic improvisation. Some 
artistic improvisational practices are more experimental, free and unrestrained; 
other ones are more traditional, controlled and bounded to different kinds of 
constraints, contexts, instructions, patterns of actions, styles, etc. In some 
cases improvisers play against the rules and/or the conventions and transform, 
change, and violate them. In other cases improvisers’ inventive creativity 
develops inside the space of the rules of a practice. The two cases are not 
mutually exclusive de facto, because during the same performance improvisers 
can enact both kinds of improvisation: inside the rules and against the rules. 
Moreover, even in controlled, structured, and bounded improvisational 
performances, the normativity of the process develops to a certain extent in 
real-time. The meaning and the value of the each move made by the 
improvisers is not only determined through the reference to a pre-existent and 
already established context, but it contributes to shaping its own normative 
context. A dialectic between plan and action is in play here. Each move can 
assign in retrospect different meanings and different values to what has been 
planned as well as to what has being previously done in the course of 
performance: so that, one can know only in retrospect whether a move has 
been right or wrong. What follows can change the meaning and the value of 
what has been previously decided and made. Every unexpected event and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Bertinetto 2011 and 2012a (and the literature quoted there). 
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accident may and should be taken as an affordance for valuable artistic 
outcomes, for the meaning and the value of unforeseen accidents depends, at 
least in part, from the way we react to them. Therefore, even the criteria for the 
artistic evaluation of the performance can change through the performance.4 
Lot of studies about improvisation highlight the risky quality of improvised 
performance. This quality allegedly derives from the lack of a well-defined plan 
that the performance should realize. In improvisation performers risk to fail 
because they have to act, react and interact, without knowing in advance what 
will happen next and without knowing how the results of their activity will be 
understood and evaluated and how will they be followed up. In this sense 
improvised artistic performances are very much like everyday life. However, I do 
not agree that they are more risky than non-improvised performances of 
composed artworks. On the contrary, it seems that the risk to fail while 
performing composed works is higher, because in this case the range of 
possibilities of a right performance is quite narrow. Performers have to comply 
with instructions that are not supposed to be transformed during the 
performance. In the case of improvisation matters are different: here the 
normative frame can change to a higher degree. Obviously, if improvisers fail, 
they cannot correct, conceal, or destroy their works. However, they have the 
important possibility –that executants of prepared instructions lack– to 
retrospectively take an apparently wrong move as an affordance for creativity, 
for instance by reacting to the evaluative feedback of the audience or of the 
fellow performers’ during the performance: by doing so, they can transform the 
normative context of the performance and the criteria for its evaluation. Thus, 
the risk can turn out to be a favorable opportunity. Therefore, the real risk of 
improvised performances is rather the risk of lacking aesthetic merit: for 
instance, the risk to be boring or incomprehensible and meaningless. It is the 
same risk all artists face in their respective fields. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Bertinetto 2011, 2013, 2014a, and 2014b. 
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5. 
But we must still emphasize an important difference between performing arts 
(like dance, theatre and music) and other kinds of artistic practices. 5  In 
improvisation in performing arts the process of art production coincides (to a 
large extent) with the product. The audience does not experience the 
performance of an already composed work, but the ephemeral production of a 
performance. The improvised performance is ephemeral, because it is tied to its 
space-time conditions (although it can be audio-visually recorded). Improvised 
performances of this kind are ephemeral items using ephemeral media (while 
works of music, theatre and dance are enduring work using ephemeral media) 
(see London 2013). What has been done, cannot be corrected or erased, and 
disappears a second later, while being replaced by what follows up. 
Conversely, in non-performing arts –like painting, sculpture, films, photography, 
etc.– there is no coincidence between process and product. Although the 
process is ephemeral, the product is made in an enduring medium. So the 
beholders can enjoy the product, without being acquainted with the process of 
production. Therefore, even though the production of a painting, say, can be 
partly improvised, the product survives the end of the process. Moreover, during 
the process of production, what is done is not replaced by what follows up: on 
the contrary, what follows up is added to what was previously done (which can 
be corrected or erased). Hence, improvisation in non-performing arts counts 
rather as a method of art production. Obviously, it can be important to know that 
the artwork has been produced in this way in order to grasp its aesthetic and 
artistic meaning and to appreciate its cognitive contribution and the aesthetic 
significance thereof. However, in this case the process is usually not perceived 
directly by beholders; and, when it is so perceived, the production is seen as a 
kind of theatre performance. 6  In non-performing arts the process usually 
precedes the product offered to beholders’ contemplation and only the 
perception of the product (considered in the right cultural context) can provide 
with some kind of knowledge or understanding about themselves and the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cf. Bertinetto 2014c. 
6 In order to grasp what I mean here the reader may see Hans Namur’s movie Jackson Pollock 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cgBvpjwOGo) (1950/1) and Henry-Georges Clouzot’s 
movie Le mystère Picasso (1956). 
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via illustration or exemplification. Thus, in this case, the fact that the artwork has 
been improvised seems to be of little relevance for the possible knowledge we 
can achieve through the artwork. It can be useful as information about the 
process of production, and this information can increase the cognitive supply of 
the artwork; but, like other methods of production, it does not seem to be of 
primary importance for understanding the cognitive perspective the artwork is 
intended to show.  
 
6. 
I think that we now have the elements required for answering the main 
questions addressed at the beginning of the paper. The questions were whether 
in performing arts the improvisational method of art production I have just 
outlined is per se significant as source of knowledge via illustration or 
exemplification, what and how can artistic improvisation illustrate or exemplify, 
and how can this knowledge contributes to the aesthetic value of the 
performance. 
To answer these questions we have to focus on the fact that in improvisation in 
the field of performing art practices, due to the coincidence between process 
and product, the improvisational quality of the process which is directly attended 
to by the audience is relevant for appreciating the cognitive import of the artistic 
performance and its aesthetic merit.  
So, let’s try to understand what and how an improvised performance –in 
theatre, music, and dance– can illustrate and/or exemplify, due to its 
improvisational character. 
Several studies maintain that improvisation, in virtue of its (alleged) spontaneity, 
can illustrate or exemplify human freedom and even anarchy and that, through 
this illustration or exemplarization, improvisers aim at making ethical 
and/political statements like protesting against political authorities or claiming 
the rights of oppressed groups of people. Without understanding those 
meanings the audience misses a big deal of the artistic value of the 
performance. 
In some cases, performers involves the audience in the performance and 
intervene directly and explicitly in their actual social and political situation, for 
example occupying spaces for the performances they have been not allowed to, 
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or making explicit political assertions connected with the actual reality of their 
social and political situation. In this way performers aim at breaking the divide 
between art and life: the artistic performance looses its fictional character and, 
as a consequence, the transformational power sometimes associated with the 
art experience –that the experience of art is transformative, is for example a 
famous thesis by Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Gadamer 1994, 102)– is 
immediately part of the content and of the meaning of the artistic performance. 
As a tool for intervening in social and political life, improvisation can be an 
ideological weapon. As I have recently written, “[…] this is a leitmotiv, a 
common thread that connects disparate cultural trends, from the poetical 
performances of the Italian improvvisatori (cf. Esterhammer 2008) in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to free jazz and improv-theatre of the last 
decades of the past century.7” (Bertinetto 2013, 28). 
“As a matter of fact” –please allow me to quote myself again at some length– 
“improvisation, unlike other art practices and objects, does not delight 
exclusively because it distracts attention from everyday life; on the contrary, the 
pleasures of (some important genres and kinds of) artistic improvisation, may 
also be due to its ability to engage both performers and audience in actions 
which not only have striking moral, social and political significance (which is 
certainly not an exclusive prerogative of improvised art), but that, at least in 
some cases, are concrete interventions in the particular historical situations in 
which they occur and, as such, modify those situations.8 In improvisation the 
real seems to outstrip the possible and the imaginary. For this reason, I insist, 
improvisation seems to have an anarchist and anti-institutional character that is 
at odds with the widespread view that the space of art is the imaginative 
autonomous dimension of the aesthetic experience that can flourish in locations 
erected for this special purpose. In this context, it is significant that at the end of 
the eighteenth century in Austria a law was passed that forbade theatrical 
improvisation for political reasons. 9  The then political rulers understood 
improvised theatre not as an expression of aesthetic art, that builds imaginary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  See Johnstone, 1979; Nachmanovitch 1990; Belgrad 1998; Sparti 2005, 2007, 2010; 
Muyumba 2009; Alterhaug 2004; Béthune 2008; Brown 2006. 
8 De Raymond 1980, 212-213. 
9 See Borgards 2009. For the subversive power of (poetic) improvisation in the romantic age, 
see Esterhammer 2008, 1-13. 
Disturbis 14 	  
	   13	  
worlds in the fictional space of the stage, but as an illegal practice that directly 
intervenes in the real life of the audience, addressed as co-performers and 
invited to act to transform the socio-historical situations in which they lived. 
Performance art of our time seems to have an analogous raison d'être.10”  
(Bertinetto 2013, 28). In such improvisational practices art is intended not as a 
mirror of reality, but rather as a tool for transforming it. 
 
7. 
However, besides considerations as to the political efficacy of improvisational 
performances in provoking real changes, this is only a partial view of the matter. 
On the one hand, a performance can illustrate, exemplify, and, in so doing, 
encourage freedom and anarchy, or more generally a transformation of reality, 
without being improvised. On the other hand, not every improvised performance 
has political and social aims or intends to illustrate or exemplify some social or 
political claim. This is typical for some kinds of improvisational art practices, 
genres and style, like free jazz, but it is far from being a general feature of 
artistic improvisation.  
More generally, improvisation can for sure express and show spontaneity, 
unpredictability, and originality, but it can also express and show routine 
patterns of repetitive actions based upon the construction of habits.11 Therefore, 
artistic improvisation does not illustrate or exemplify always a demand or a 
need of freedom –both negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to). It can 
do that, but this is not necessarily so.    
Still less convincing is the idea that every improvised performance aims at 
breaking the divide between stage and stalls. Again, I think that this is true of 
some kind of improvisational participatory performances, but of course not of 
every improvisational performances. Although in some improvisational practices 
every event of the environment can become part of the performance, cultural 
conventions dictate often a clear separation between performers and audience, 
between stalls and stage, between art and life: in such cases the audience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cf. E. Fischer-Lichte 2004.  
11 The reason offered by Adorno (see Adorno 1982 and 1984) for supporting his famous 
negative judgement of jazz is precisely, at least in large part, the alleged routinary and repetitive 
quality of jazz improvisation. However, Adorno’s criticism of jazz seems not to be supported by 
a competent knowledge of this music.   
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contemplate the improvised performance made by somebody else, without (at 
least directly) intervening in it. 
However, it remains true that, while attending to an improvised performance, 
the audience has the tendency to take a more participatory attitude. This is due 
sometimes to neurocognitive reasons. For example, empiric research has 
proved that the neural activity of the brains of listeners to a musical 
improvisation mirrors the neural activity of the brains of improvising 
performers.12 
Nonetheless, what is indeed of more importance for our purposes is of course 
the simple fact that while attending to an improvised performance, the audience 
“are actually witnessing the shaping activity of the improviser.” (Alperson 2010, 
274). As Philip Alperson claims about musical improvisation, “it is as if we in the 
audience gain privileged access to the performer’s mind at the moment of 
creation.” (Alperson 2010, 274).  
Hence, on my opinion what improvisation in performing arts can generally 
illustrate and exemplify as such are two related kinds of things. 
a) Improvisation can illustrate or exemplify artistic creativity, because a 
successful improvisation possesses the property of being creative and, staged 
in the proper context, can refer to artistic creativity, and to how our creative 
attempts can be successful or fail. Since I already have developed this point 
elsewhere (see Bertinetto 2012a), I will not make this here again. So I will 
immediately turn to the second kind of things artistic improvisation can 
illustratively or exemplarily represent.  
b) Improvisation can illustrate and exemplify ways of staging the construction 
and the developments of the self, its more or less routine-bound and 
mechanical or more or less original and innovative actions, and also its 
interactions with other subjects as well as with the natural and cultural 
environment. Improvisation provides illustrative representations of the ways 
subjects can shape themselves through their actions, gestures and expressions 
and can articulate interactions with other subjects and with their natural and 
cultural context. Improvisation can also illustrate the dynamics of groups, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For some reflections about the perception of musical improvisation see Bertinetto 2012c. See 
Canonne 2014 for an inquire concerning the main feature of the aesthetic appreciation of 
musical improvisation. 
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well as the interactions between individuals, between individuals and groups 
and between different groups.13  
In improvisation on the stage, individual and collective subjects can present 
themselves as more or less “free”, as more or less at ease with their social and 
natural environment, or as struggling for establishing themselves in a hostile 
situation. The different ways performers interact with each other can illustrate 
moral interactions and moral attitudes toward oneself, other individuals and the 
world. This does not happen only in theatre and dance, where performers can 
express themselves with spoken language and body gestures, but also in music 
(Hagberg 2008 has shown this in the case of jazz).  
One may reply to this that this is not specific of artistic improvisation. It seems 
that every kind of non-improvised art can illustrate the expressive and gestural 
shaping of subjects and the interaction between subjects and between subjects 
and the social and natural environment. Goethe for instance defined the string 
quartet as a conversation between four intelligent persons. 
However, there really is a specific quality to artistic improvisation. It consists in 
the fact that in an improvised performance actions, gestures, expressions as 
well as interactions and conversations are actually performed in real-time. They 
are not the execution of pre-written actions, interactions and conversations. The 
display of the vicissitudes of the self and the development of inter-subjective 
interactions is not only achieved by means of re-presentation. The articulations 
of the self, the developments of inter-subjective relations, and the ways agents 
play with rules and with unforeseen accidents, are rather presented as enacted 
live, in the moment, in real-time. The actions presented to the audience (with 
the means of music, dance, and theatre) are real actions, performed with (more 
or less) sensitivity and attentivity to the actual situation and to the moment in 
which the performance is taking place. Thus performers present, with artistic 
tools and in artistic media and frames, what is continuously happening in real 
life, in which “[…] one finds order and disorder, fulfilment of expectations and 
their violation, freedom and constraint [...]“ (Berkovitz 2010, 175). When they 
are good, performers possess and display a particular readiness to the 
changing environment and to the emergent affordances it generates and, in so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See for example Bertram 2014; Borgo 1996/7 and 2005; Pétard 2010; Sparti 2010. 
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doing, they show us, in an exemplar way, how we can successfully extricate 
ourselves from the unexpected situations life presents us with. 
Therefore, artistic improvisation does not only represent, but presents and 
enacts “intentional life” (Hagberg 2008, 281), because it is the staging of the 
developments of the self and of its inter-subjective relations in a changing 
environment. Presenting and representing subjects who cooperate, compete, 
act with or without respect, responsibility, attentiveness, and so on, „improvised 
performance allows the audience members a chance to share in the 
construction of the narrative before their very eyes and ears“ (Berkovitz 2010, 
175). Therefore, although I said above that in order to answer to the question of 
the epistemic relevance of artistic improvisation we should not consider the 
“automaieutic” potential of improvisation –in virtue of which improvising 
performers discover previously ignored aspects of their personalities–, but only 
the knowledge which perceivers achieve while attending to an improvised 
performance, it must now be pointed out that improvisation may be appreciated 
by the audience precisely as a process in virtue of which performers, interacting 
with other performers and with the environment, present the way they discover, 
shape, and express their self. 
This is not to say that what the audience perceive while attending to an 
improvisation is always the authentic expression of the self or the authentic 
manifestation of inter-subjective interactions. Artistic improvisation displays not 
only the authentic subjects or the authentic interactions, but also the 
construction of images of the self and of inter-subjective relations. In this sense, 
artistic improvisation shows society as a theatre, which is more or less authentic 
and genuine, or artificial and counterfeit. The stage is a space in which 
performers offer themselves as well as their masks to the audience (Pétard 
2010, 202); it is a space in which performers, who are engaged in the artistic 
interaction on the spot with other performers and with the unforeseeable 
affordances of the present unrepeatable situation, evaluate themselves and are, 
in turn, evaluated by the audience. Yet, performers too evaluate the audience 
and react to their evaluative (affective and cognitive) reactions. While attending 
this recursive and reflexive process,14 the audience can attentively focus on this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Cf. Landgraf 2001 and Bertinetto 2014b. 
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reciprocity of evaluation, which has performative power, and, while judging the 
degree of authenticity or of camouflage of each exhibition, understand, to 
different degrees, the dynamics of the developments of the self interacting with 
other selves and different kinds of natural and cultural environment in a 
succession of situations as well as the way in which, through the adventures of 
the performance, the improvising subjects discover previously ignored aspects 
of themselves. 
Hence, in general, we can conclude that, while attending to an improvised 
artistic performance, we attend to a presentation of the ways our social and 
embodied intelligence shapes and organises itself and the world and, while 
responding to the unforeseeable solicitations of the environment and of others 
interacting subjects, deals with uncertainty and copes with the unpredictable 
nature of life, adapting plans to present situations,15 with more or less sensitivity 
to what is happening now, and with a higher or lower degree of success. The 
insights into the ways performers expose themselves to different problematic 
situations and –while and by interacting with other people and with the 
environment as well as while and by discovering themselves through this 
experience– try to solve the problems generated by themselves and by other 
interplaying subjects (cf. Brown 1996, 365), is a remarkable knowledge that 
contributes to the artistic value we assign to the performance.  
The specific contribution of artistic improvisation to the significance of the 
cognitive power of art for its aesthetic merits relies on the different kinds of 
“presentational” illustration and exemplarization it can offer of the fact that in life  
- we continuously deal with emergent and unforeseen accidents, while shaping 
our self in interaction with other people and our environments and, 
- while interacting with unforeseen situations, we experience and learn 
previously ignored aspects of our self. 
Obviously, in each different artistic improvisational practice these illustration and 
exemplarization have different qualities, accordingly to the different artistic 
media and artistic genres and styles of the relative practice.  
 
8. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See De Raymond 1980, 107-110, 154. 
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I think that a possible, and perhaps obvious, objection to my thesis can be this. 
We recognize the improvisational quality of a performance –sometimes in virtue 
of empathetic response– when and if we are well acquainted with the practice 
at issue (and, in particular, with the genre and the style of the performance). 
However, if we are not expert of a practice, we can fail to perceive and feel that 
performers are improvising spontaneously and neither following plans and 
instructions, nor even offering a fake improvisation or a prepared performance 
that only arouses the feeling of an improvised performance; or, on the contrary, 
we can misunderstand a fake improvisation, taking it as an actual improvisation. 
Hence, in those cases, it is obviously impossible to acknowledge the 
contribution of the improvisational quality of the performance to the significance 
of its cognitive supply for its aesthetic merit. By considering this, one can also 
deny that improvisation provide listeners and beholders with knowledge of the 
kind outlined above. For, how can improvisation offer this knowledge, if the 
difference between improvised and not improvised performance is not 
perceptively clear and discernible?  
The objection can be answered by allowing that, for sure, when we do not 
understand the improvisational quality of the performance, we also cannot 
understand its epistemic supply and the artistic merit thereof. However, it is not 
necessary to perceive or feel the improvisational quality of the performance in 
order to know that it is really improvised. We may know that the performance is 
improvised, because of the context, or thanks to more or less explicit 
statements made by performers or organisers, or in virtue of some kinds of 
associations. If we are going to a jazz concert, for instance, we can reasonably 
think that we will listen to music that is (usually partly) improvised. For we use to 
associate jazz to improvisation. 
Yet, once we know that the performance is improvised, we can (and should) 
intentionally attend to it as an improvisation, by perceiving and understanding 
its improvisational quality, i.e. by grasping the performance as a process of 
creation (see Canonne 2014). Thus, by means of intentionally attending to what 
is actually performed, we empathetically follow the (possibly changing) 
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intentions of the performers16 –who interact with each other, with the audience 
and with the environment. In this way, listeners and beholders can grasp and 
interpret the epistemic content presented by this improvisational quality, while 
evaluating it as part of its artistic merit. And, if we somehow get the information 
that a performance we did not know that was improvised was indeed 
improvised, then we can retrospectively re-shape the meaning of some of its 
aspects and the aesthetic merit thereof, because the knowledge of the fact that 
it has been improvised lets us interpret it in a different way. 
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